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IMPORTANT AUCTION CHARACTERISTICS IN EMARKETPLACE DECISIONS: AN EXPLORATORY LOOK AT
AUCTION SELECTION AND PRODUCT VALUATION
John Drake
Auburn University
drakejr@auburn.edu

Abstract
The emerging success of online auction marketplaces has challenged researchers to identify the
characteristics that affect success of these auctions. It is far from clear how certain auction
characteristics affect bidding decisions in the context of individual ethical foundations. We
conducted an exploratory study that examined which auction characteristics were most important
when making decisions for selecting an auction and when deciding on how much to bid. Results
indicate that online auction buyers do treat the importance of auction characteristics differently at
each decision. Interesting findings with regards to seller feedback and various other auction
characteristics warrant further study.
Keywords: e-Marketplace, decision-making, ethics, exploratory

Introduction
Auctions have experienced tremendous commercial success online. Despite the success of these auctions,
researchers understand little about how and why buyers choose a particular auction or how and why a buyer decides
how much to bid on that auction.
In determining what auction characteristics affect the bid price, researchers have explored such characteristics as
feedback scores, escrow services, starting price, reserve prices, psychological contract violations, and certifications.
Although less numerous, some research has explored which auction characteristics affect the selection of a particular
auction over alternatives. Such auction characteristics as current bid amount have been shown to influence auction
entry (Anwar, McMillan et al. 2006). Corresponding research found that the number of bidders in an auction is
related to the book value, seller reputation, and the interaction effect between minimum bid and secret reserve price
(Bajari and Hortacsu 2003).
We made two observations from these research efforts; 1) the auction characteristics chosen to observe were
selected prior to the data collection and 2) several of the characteristics are significant at both the decision to enter
an auction and at the decision on the amount to bid. The first observation suggests that an exploratory study may be
appropriate to verify and rank the importance of these auction characteristics to consumers. The second observation
suggests one of two things; (a) these characteristics are important for both decision points or (b) there is more
complexity than the current theories account for.
This study contributes to literature by verifying which auction characteristics are most important to online auction
buyers when selecting an auction and when deciding how much to bid, and by determining how the importance
auction characteristics change from auction selection to product valuation. These results are compared with existing
theories used in explaining online auction behavior.
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Literature Review
At the decision to enter an auction, a buyer must make two decisions. The first is whether to select this particular
auction or not. We call this the auction selection. Even if a buyer selects multiple auctions in which to “cross-bid”
(Anwar, McMillan et al. 2006), the buyer must pick in which auctions they wish to cross-bid. The second decision
is how much to bid on the product in that auction. We call this the product valuation. The product valuation may
include factors that are not product related, but the ultimate goal of an auction consumer is to purchase a product at
no more than the value they see in that product. Even if the decision dynamics change near the end of an auction,
the value assessment is likely to have already occurred (Ariely and Simonson 2003). After the auction selection and
the product valuation, the consumer places their bid.

Ethical foundations
Two diametrically opposed ethical theories suggest two different approaches to decision-making at these two
decision points. In the first ethical perspective, Contractarianism (Gauthier 1986), individuals believe everyone acts
opportunistically if they can get away with it. It is only the possibility of being discovered that fosters moral
restraints. The consequences of this perspective in online auctions are that buyers assume all sellers will act
opportunistically if given the chance. This leads them to trivialize the auction selection and to focus exclusively on
the product valuation. Seller reputation acts as a signal to how likely a seller will act opportunistically and as such
directly affects the price premium (Dellarocas 2003). In the second ethical perspective, Objectivism (Rand 1964),
moral judgment is based on observed facts. Justice requires the evaluation of the merchant before a buyer considers
conducting a transaction with that seller. In online auction terms, an objective evaluation of a seller determines
whether or not that auction is selected. Only sellers high reputations are consider for auction selection and no
further evaluation of the seller is necessary after that selection.

Auction Characteristics
In this study, the determination of the importance of these characteristics in auction selection and product valuation
is largely exploratory. However, we expect to observe several trends based on previous research.
Empirical evidence shows that some characteristics of auctions are significant at both decision points (reputation,
current bid, and reserve price as noted above), but many characteristics, such as book value, psychological contract
violations, and escrow services, are not (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Hu, Lin et al. 2004; Pavlou and Gefen 2005).
These differences lead us to suspect that the set of heuristics used for the two decision points should be different. If
they were not, then the two decisions would essentially be synonymous, affectively trivializing any comparison
between the two. This would overturn our common-sense understanding of the process and years of research that
has differentiated between the two. Because we see little likelihood this will happen, our first hypothesis is as
follows:
H1: Buyers will rate the importance of auction characteristics differently between auction selection and product
valuation.
Individuals employing a Contractarian perspective will evaluate the seller reputation in the product valuation
decision. Individuals employing an Objectivist perspective will evaluate the seller reputation in the auction
selection decision. Direct measures of one reputation heuristic, the feedback score, show that its affect on final bid
price varies, depending on the context. In guitar auctions, feedback was largely insignificant in determining final
sale price (Eaton 2002). For Rose Bowl game tickets, the seller’s reputation was insignificant in influencing the
final bid price (Ariely and Simonson 2003). Ba and Pavlou (2002) found that negative feedback scores significantly
affected the price premium of various products when interacting with price. However, the number of negative
feedbacks was insignificant in coin auctions, even though the overall reputation was significant. When product
information, timing of bid, and other actions were taken into account, seller reputation became insignificant in
affecting the final bid price of coin auctions (Kauffman and Wood 2006). These conflicting results that the feedback
score has on the final bid price, along with its influence disappearing when other factors are taken into account,
leads us to believe that seller feedback scores are not as important at product valuation as at auction selection. The
findings of Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), that the number of bidders in coin auctions is partially dependent on the
feedback score and that the final bid price is partially dependent on the number of bidders, supports the importance
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of seller feedback in auction selection. The small affects feedback scores have on price are likely due to a residual
affects, mediated through the number of bidders.
H2: Buyers will rate the importance of seller’s feedback score higher in auction selection than in product valuation.

Method
In the first phase of our study, 18 experienced online auction participants (whom have purchased at least five items
in online auctions) identified 29 unique heuristics that affect either auction selection or product valuation. Of these
29 characteristics, 19 were specific to the auction itself, listed in table 1. The remaining 10 required knowledge
outside of auction website, which went beyond the scope of our study.
Table 1. Important auction characteristics
Auction characteristics
Current bid
End time/time remaining
Rate of Bidding
Number of bidders
Shipping costs
Shipping options
Shipping insurance

Seller location
Return policy
Payment methods accepted
Proxy bidding
Reserve price
Minimum bid

Buy now option
Item quality
Product Description
Photo of Product
Security
Seller feedback

The second phase consisted of a pre-test and pilot test, which verified our instrument. The third phase involved a
survey administered to users of online auctions. Participants came from two groups, 138 undergraduate students in
an MIS class at a major southeastern university and a convenience sample of 104 participants outside a major
college sporting event, for a total of 242 participants. Students were enticed to participate through extra credit
offerings. For the second group, the researchers targeted attendees that appeared older than 25 and admitted to
buying something on an online auction. The over age 25 heuristic eliminated many of the undergraduate population
and was more representative of the general population of online auction participants. We found that trying to predict
from which of the two samples an observation came using logistic regression resulted in a Goodness of fit (χ2 =
9.638, df = 8, p = 0.291) that was not significant and a -2 log likelihood (χ2 = 17.257, df = 19, p = 0.572) that was
not significant. These results suggested that the two samples could not be distinguished from one-another. To
double check, we ran each analysis separately and observed almost identical results. Because of this, our analysis
combined the two samples. The combined sample consisted of 55% males, with a mean age of 31 years, a mean
income between $40,000 and $60,000, and auction experience of over 3 years, participating several times a year,
and spending between a half hour to a full hour every month on an online auction site.
We captured the importance of each of the 19 auction characteristics listed above on a 5-point Likert scale for both
auction selection and product valuation by listing the characteristics and asking participants to rate the importance of
each in their decision to select an auction and to value the product. We also captured general demographic data and
online auction experience. Online auction experience was adapted from Danaher & Mullarkey’s (2003) internet
experience scale.

Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for the auction characteristics can be found in table 2. A correlation matrix has been omitted to
save space. Please email the author directly if you would like to see this data.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Auction Characteristic
ASa Mean
Current bid
3.913
End time/ time remaining
4.091
Bid rate
3.038
Number of bidders
3.138
Shipping costs
3.893
Shipping options
3.307
Shipping insurance
2.921
Seller location
2.726
Return policy
3.610
Payment methods accepted 3.992
Proxy bidding
2.776
Reserve price
3.439
Minimum bid
3.328
Buy now option
3.508
Item quality
4.469
Product Description
4.364
Photo of Product
4.517
Security
4.204
Seller feedback
4.066
a) AS = Auction Selection
b) PV = Product Valuation
* significance at the p < .05 level.
** significance at the p < .01 level.

PVb Mean
4.095
4.046
3.204
3.228
3.740
3.249
3.025
2.768
3.462
3.806
2.854
3.454
3.536
3.606
4.339
4.258
4.359
3.959
4.017

Mean
Diff.
-0.182
0.054
-0.181
-0.105
0.153
0.050
-0.109
-0.033
0.155
0.187
-0.064
-0.008
-0.210
-0.096
0.122
0.104
0.169
0.238
0.050

Std.
Dev.
.92
.85
1.06
1.09
.93
1.02
.96
1.06
.93
.77
.92
.99
.98
1.00
.77
.76
.73
.84
.81

t

df

p-value

-3.074
.988
-2.635
-1.485
2.564
.761
-1.753
-.488
2.577
3.761
-1.058
-.132
-3.294
-1.485
2.450
2.106
3.567
4.396
.954

241
239
237
238
241
239
238
239
238
240
235
237
237
238
237
239
235
238
239

.002**
.324
.009**
.139
.011*
.447
.081
.626
.011*
.000**
.291
.895
.001**
.139
.015*
.036*
.000**
.000**
.341

To test hypothesis 1, that buyers rate the importance of auction characteristics differently between auction selection
and product valuation, we determined the difference between the importance of the auction selection and the
importance of the product valuation for each characteristic regardless of individual. An F-test (table 3) showed that
the differences are significantly distinct, supporting hypothesis 1. We can assume the importance of auction
characteristics in auction selection differ from the importance of the same characteristics in product valuation.
Table 3. ANOVA of the Mean Differences
Source
Between
Within
Total

SS
483.6955
4588.454
5072.149

df
18
4579
4597

MS
26.87197
1.002065

F
26.8166

p-value
0.000

To test hypothesis 2, where buyers will rate the importance of seller’s feedback score higher in auction selection
than in product valuation, we conducted a t-test on the difference in seller feedback to see if it was significantly
different from zero (table 2). According to the test, the mean difference in the importance of seller feedback is not
significantly different from zero. There is not enough evidence to support hypothesis 2. This suggests that seller
feedback may be far more complicated than originally thought.
Although hypothesis 2 was not supported, suggesting that seller feedback is not more important in auction selection
than in product valuation, there was also no evidence that it was more important in product valuation either. While
we hypothesized that seller feedback is one of the most common reputation heuristics, it may not be the only one.
Other auction characteristics, such as return policy or payment methods accepted, could contribute to reputation,
signaling the propensity of the seller to accept responsibility for faulty products. When considering this, we
observe that both return policy and payment method accepted are more important in auction selection than in
product valuation. These may be viewed as a trustworthiness signals, building competence, benevolence, and
integrity based beliefs (McKnight, Choudhury et al. 2002). There is no doubt that opportunistic behavior exists on
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online auctions, but how participants react to this fact cannot be explained by the Contractarian perspective alone.
When selecting auctions in which to participate, buyers consider seller feedback and other trustworthiness signals to
make that decision.
Game theory has gained traction in online auction research due to the emergence of reputation in game theory
models of informational asymmetries and repeated actions with the possibility of observing past behavior
(Dellarocas 2003). However, game theory, based on the Contractarian ethical perspective, presents economic
models that may not be as successful in predicting online auction behavior as expected. There are three types of
behavior that violates expected-utility maximization of game theory; when the utility functions are inapplicable,
when the subjective probability distribution is inapplicable, and when the economic model is inapplicable (Myerson
1991). Both the utility functions and the subjective probability distribution are violated because participants often
consider seller reputation as a qualitative heuristic for auction selection, rather than as a quantitative variable in
product valuation. Game theory may successfully represent the mindset of some auction participants who view
auction participation as an inherent conflict of interest, but there is no evidence that this represents the majority.
Additional findings reveal that of the ten characteristics with the difference in means between auction selection and
product valuation significantly different from zero, three of them were more important in the product valuation
decision: current bid, rate of bidding, and minimum bid. The other seven characteristics - shipping costs, return
policy, payment method accepted, item quality, product description, photo of product, and security - were more
important in the auction selection decision.
The five most important auction characteristics in selecting an auction were photo of the product, item quality,
product description, security, and end time/time remaining. The five most important auction characteristics in
product valuation were photo of product, item quality, product description, current bid, and end time/time
remaining. Interestingly, even though product description and photo of product are significantly less important in
product valuation than in auction selection, they are still the two of the most important factors in determining the
product valuation.
The five least important characteristics for both auction selection and product valuation were seller location, proxy
bidding, shipping insurance, rate of bidding, and the number of bidders. In spite of the fact that rate of bidding is
significantly more important in product valuation than in auction selection, it is still on average one of the least
important characteristics in product valuation.

Conclusion
The biggest contribution of this study is the discovery of the relative importance of particular auction characteristics
to auction selection and product valuation and to the change in that importance. With these findings, we verified
that a difference between the importance of auction characteristics in auction selection and product valuation is
indeed significant. We also found that seller feedback is on average equally important in auction selection and
product valuation.
The exploratory nature of this study offers many potential avenues for future research, exploring each of these
characteristics and their relationships in more depth. There is also the possibility that the importance of particular
auction characteristics may change based on personality, experience, age, type of product purchased, or the expected
price of the product. Identification of common profiles of online auction participants can both help the auction
marketplace owners develop tools to facilitate the auctions on their site and help sellers create auctions that best
satisfy buyers’ needs.
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